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Japan, nevertheless, fears the possibility of American competition, particularly in Manchuria, where she has been pursuing a policy by which foreign, including American, goods must be subordinated in that market to Japanese goods, and must be sold through Japanese firms. Potentially this policy is meaningless because, if China and Manchuria are to be modernized, no one country, surely not Japan, can supply either the quantity or the variety of goods and services required. Yet Japan's attitude is resented and has been accepted as a frontal attack on American trade. The Russians do not believe that the New Deal will succeed. They generally hold that it will be impossible for the United States to put its vast industrial and agrarian population back to work without developing foreign markets. They maintain that the capitalistic system of distribution makes it inevitable for the United States ultimately to seek such markets and China offers a favorable arena for American economic exploitation. Therefore, the argument proceeds, if the New Deal should fail, it will become necessary for the Unites States to enter the Chinese market aggressively. This the Japanese fear as well. Some Japanese go even further. They fear that if re-employment fails in the United States, a war with Japan may become an economic necessity. It is this fear which has played upon by Japanese apostles of a big Navy. But potentialities and fears of failure of recovery of the Unites States cannot altogether be accepted as a premise for a war. The potentialities of a China Market have always existed; yet no world war has occurred because of them. Nonetheless, Japan constantly finds new reasons for fearing the United States. Similarly, the United States discovers new reasons for distrusting Japan. These fears and distrusts are not grounded in the economics of the Pacific. They are psychological and historical; they are often without solution because they are intangible. Viscount Kikujiro Ishii once wrote: "Ever since Japan's entrance into the family of modern nations in the middle of the nineteenth century her diplomacy has striven, and still thrives, to attain two objectives - equality and security." In this search she has been notably assisted by the United States. After Commodore Perry, in command of an American fleet, opened Japan to Western economic and political processes, the United States in 1885 sent Townsend Harris to Japan as its first Council General. Undoubtedly it was Harrison who opened the eyes of the rulers of Japan to the world about them, to the dangers of European imperialism, to the necessity of bending their energies in the direction of equality and security. As soon as Japan emerged from her isolation, her perspective enemy was clearly Russia, which had already begun to move into Manchuria and Korea and the islands to the north of Japan. Japan was protected from Russia, in a manner that the Japanese cannot fail to recognize, by the attitude of the United States. John Hay's Open Door policy was aimed largely at Russian aggression in Manchuria. There can be no question that President Theodore Roosevelt gave the Anglo-Japanese Alliance tacit support. When war broke out between Russia and Japan in 1904, the United States helped to finance Japan, and Theodore Roosevelt defiantly indicated to Germany and France that if they supported Russia against Japan, as they had in 1895, Japan would receive the support of the Unites States and Great Britain. When it was advisable to end the war while Japan was still the victor, Roosevelt called a peace conference at Portsmouth and Japan gained an empire. Until that moment, no two countries could have been more friendly. Japan imitated American ways; the Unites States supported Japan's development as a modern State. Then began a series of misunderstandings which have not yet ceased Why fight Japan? By George E. Sokolsky Current History - February 1935